This study described that phenomenon in the law-making process in Indonesia by displaying the data on the behaviours or issuance of laws during lame duck sessions from 1997 to 2020. Compared with that of regular sessions, laws issued during the lame duck sessions significantly looked more productive but they did not comply with the mandate of laws desiring that each bill was supposed to be discussed in three sessions at the longest. In terms of the materials regulated in Laws, many lawmakers took advantage of a lame duck session to pass any laws in favour of the state officials that often generated public rejection and had shifted its participatory role through a judicial review at the Constitutional Court. Empirical tests of the law’s response to economic growth using econometrics analysis also indicate that current laws have a negative impact on the economy. House of the Representatives (DPR) and the President had actually understood the logic that a lame duck session was not such a right time to make a law; however, making a law during a lame duck session was not prohibited and there were no such clear rulings restricting the making of a law during this session. © The Author(s) 2021. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Hansard Society; all rights reserved.